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Lytle v. Rosemere Estate Prop. Owners, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. (Dec. 26, 2013)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined two issues: (1) whether an NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend may be properly directed at a post-judgment order or whether that rule is limited 
to final judgments; and (2) whether NRAP 4(a)(4) tolling applied to the appellants’ 
NRCP 59(e) motion.   
 
Disposition 
 
 NRAP 4(a)(4) tolling applies to NRCP 59(e) motions to alter or amend that are 
directed at appealable special orders after final judgment. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In a dispute over unpaid homeowners’ association (HOA) dues, the district court 
concluded that the HOA fees were proper and awarded the respondent the unpaid HOA 
fees and attorney fees. The appellants subsequently, but prematurely filed a notice of 
appeal before the district court entered its final judgment. However, the appeal was 
deemed timely and proper once the order was filed.2  
 At the same time, the respondent moved for and was awarded supplemental 
attorney fees for its counsel’s additional services. The supplemental attorney fees award’s 
notice of entry was served by mail on August 14, 2012. Appellants timely filed a NRCP 
59(e) motion to alter or amend instead of a notice of appeal. After the district court 
denied the appellants’ motion on January 16, 2013, appellants’ filed a notice of appeal 
from the supplemental attorney fees award’s notice of entry on January 30, 2013, clearly 
well beyond 30 days from the supplemental attorney fees award’s notice of entry. The 
court subsequently issued an order to show cause whether the notice of appeal was timely 
filed because it was unclear whether appellants’ NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend 
tolled the period for filing the notice of appeal. 
  
Discussion 
 
 According to NRCP 59(a), a judgment includes “any order from which an appeal 
lies.”3 Applying the definition that “judgment” includes any appealable order, a motion to 
alter or amend is permitted as to any appealable order, not just final judgments. As such, 
a motion to alter or amend any appealable order will generally toll the time to appeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  By Allison Vitangeli 
2  Nev. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). 
3  Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
from that order. The district court’s order awarding supplemental attorney fees qualifies 
as a special order after final judgment and is therefore an appealable order.4  
 Next, the Court went on to analyze the conclusions of various Circuit Courts of 
Appeal where they addressed the same issue under the similar federal rules of civil and 
appellate procedure.5 First, in Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
tolling provision under the federal counterpart to NRAP 4(a)(4) applied to the motion to 
alter or amend even though it was directed at a post-judgment order.6 Therefore, the time 
for filing the notice of appeal was tolled until the lower court resolved the motion.7 
Additionally, the First and Second Circuit Courts have applied the definition of 
“judgment” provided in the federal counterpart of NRCP 54(a).8 The First and Second 
Circuit Courts held that the federal counterpart recognizes that “judgment” includes any 
appealable order, to determine that a motion to alter or amend could be directed at an 
appealable interlocutory order and therefore, as a result, the period for filing a notice of 
appeal was tolled in accordance with the federal counterpart to NRAP 4(a)(4).9  
 
Conclusion 
  
 The court concluded that since appellant’s NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend 
the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees falls under the definition 
provided in NRCP 54(a), it properly tolled the period for filing the notice of appeal under 
NRAP 4(a)(4). Therefore, the notice of appeal was timely filed and the appeal may 
proceed.  
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